Written by Cenk Hasan Ozdemir
Aggressors choose when wars begin. History shows they rarely get to choose when they end.
The decision to start a war rests entirely with the aggressor, but the decision to end it rarely does. This fundamental asymmetry in strategic agency has confounded military planners for centuries, yet it remains one of the most consistently ignored lessons in modern statecraft. The expectation that a superior military force can launch a “special military operation” (SMO), achieve rapid objectives, and unilaterally declare victory before the enemy can mount a meaningful defense is a seductive but historically flawed concept.
When a state initiates conflict, it typically operates under the assumption that overwhelming force, strategic surprise, or technological superiority will shatter the opponent’s will to resist. However, as Carl von Clausewitz observed in his foundational text On War, war is “an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” . Crucially, this compulsion requires the opponent to actually submit. If the defender refuses to surrender, the aggressor’s timetable becomes irrelevant, and what was planned as a swift operation inevitably metastasizes into a protracted conflict.
The Allure of the Short War
The myth of the easy, rapid victory has a long lineage. Prior to World War I, European leaders across the continent were captivated by the “short war illusion” . Military planners, influenced by the relatively brief and decisive Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, believed that modern mobilization and industrialized offensive power would produce rapid results . They assumed that the economic strain of sustaining massive armies would force a quick diplomatic settlement . Instead, the opening campaigns of 1914 quickly degenerated into four years of catastrophic trench warfare, demonstrating how initial offensive momentum can rapidly stall against determined defense and modern firepower.
This phenomenon is not confined to the early 20th century. The concept of “victory disease”—an extreme overconfidence stemming from past successes or perceived superiority—often blinds aggressors to the potential for prolonged resistance . Planners focus intensely on the initial phases of an operation, prioritizing the “negative aims” of destroying enemy forces or capturing territory, while neglecting the “positive aims” of establishing a durable political settlement .
This disconnect between tactical planning and strategic reality was starkly evident in the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, where overwhelming technological superiority and tactical victories failed to break the will of an opponent fighting an unlimited conflict . Similarly, the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was launched with expectations of a campaign lasting less than five months, only to evolve into a grueling, multi-year insurgency .
The “Special Military Operation” as a Conceptual Trap
The terminology used to describe a conflict often reflects the aggressor’s initial assumptions. The term “special military operation,” prominently used by Russia to describe its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, serves not only as domestic propaganda but also reveals a specific military-theoretical mindset.
In Russian military theory, a special military operation is distinct from a full-scale war . While war requires national mobilization, multiple strategic operations, and the total defeat of the enemy, a special military operation is theoretically designed to achieve military-political goals through a more direct, limited approach . It relies on the assumption that a single, decisive combined-arms operation—often lasting only 10 to 15 days—can coerce the enemy’s leadership into accepting unfavorable terms without the need for mass mobilization .
This theoretical framework explains the initial Russian approach in February 2022. Planners anticipated a brief, victorious campaign to decapitate the Ukrainian state, deploying an invasion force they believed would be sufficient to achieve these limited objectives without broader national mobilization . Reports even indicated that some invading units carried parade uniforms, anticipating rapid victory celebrations .
However, this approach fundamentally misread the political and social reality of the target state. The Kremlin dismissed Ukraine as an artificial state lacking national cohesion, failing to anticipate the massive popular resistance that emerged .
The Defender’s Veto
The critical flaw in the concept of the easy SMO is the failure to account for the defender’s agency. As strategic theorists note, “the enemy always gets a vote” . An aggressor can calculate their own capabilities, logistics, and timelines, but they cannot unilaterally dictate the psychological resilience, adaptability, or political will of the population they are attacking.
When the initial shock of an invasion fails to produce capitulation, the dynamics of the conflict shift dramatically. The aggressor, having planned for a short campaign, suddenly faces the logistical, economic, and political burdens of a protracted war. Meanwhile, the defender, fighting for national survival, often discovers deep reserves of societal resilience and may attract external support that further alters the balance of power.
| Historical Conflict | Aggressor’s Expectation | Actual Duration | Strategic Outcome |
| World War I (1914) | “Home before the leaves fall” | 4+ years | Collapse of multiple empires; prolonged attrition |
| Soviet-Afghan War (1979) | Rapid stabilization and regime support | 9 years | Soviet withdrawal; massive political/economic cost |
| U.S. Invasion of Iraq (2003) | Less than five months | 8+ years | Protracted insurgency; regional instability |
| Russian Invasion of Ukraine (2022) | Days to weeks (Special Military Operation) | Ongoing (4+ years) | Strategic stalemate; massive casualties; NATO expansion |
Conclusion: The Limits of Military Coercion
The history of warfare repeatedly demonstrates that initiating conflict is far easier than concluding it. While an aggressor possesses the agency to cross a border, launch a strike, or initiate a “special military operation,” the power to end the violence ultimately requires the acquiescence of the defender.
When political objectives are based on flawed assumptions about an enemy’s willingness to surrender, military operations inevitably stretch beyond their planned parameters. The myth of the easy SMO persists because it offers a politically palatable narrative of low-cost, high-reward military action. However, until military planners and political leaders fully internalize the reality that wars only end when both sides stop fighting, nations will continue to stumble into protracted conflicts they intended to win in weeks.
